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[This article characterises Australia’s corporate governance 
regime as a hybrid blend of mandatory requirements, voluntary 
rules and a regime whereby if guidelines are not followed then 
an explanation is expected to be given. Mandatory rules may 
offer stronger protections to investors, but they are inherently 
inflexible and not appropriate for all companies. Voluntary 
rules, on the other hand, raise questions of compliance. This 
article analyses the present regime and the widening role of 
‘black letter’ law after recent corporate collapses.] 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The repercussions of poor ‘corporate governance’ have resonated extensively 
in the last decade. Issues surrounding the management and control of 
companies have become of significant practical, economic and academic 
interest. The impetus behind corporate governance’s prominence in recent 
years has been the increasing globalisation of business and dramatic 
corporate collapses. The reasons behind those collapses are many and include 
fraud and dishonesty, stock option manipulation, poor market knowledge, 
incompetence and poor decision making, insolvent trading, money 
laundering, accounting failures, breaches of directors' duties, excessive pay to 
executives, extravagance, the arrogance of management teams, and the 
directors’ exaggeration about performance and failure to ascertain facts.1 In 
order to reduce the incidence of corporate collapses, and renew investor 
                                                 
* John Gerard Zadkovich, LLB (UWA), LLM (Deakin), Solicitor, Victoria. 
1 G Acuaah-Gaisie, ‘Towards more effective corporate governance mechanisms’ 
(2005) 18 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1. 
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confidence, corporate governance systems have been developed in various 
states. In the United States of America, certain aspects of corporate 
governance have become the subject of mandatory regulation under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. [This really ought to be footnoted, using US 
citation methods, though this would throw all the other footnotes out.] Other 
major common law jurisdictions, such as Australia, the UK and Canada, have 
rejected mandatory corporate governance legislation of the US kind in favour 
of partially mandatory structures. They permit companies to make choices 
about certain governance practices while compelling disclosure regarding 
these choices in certain instances.2 Which corporate governance regime is 
optimal has been the subject of examination, and much debate surrounds 
whether a mandatory, voluntary or compromise corporate governance system 
is ideal. This paper will look at the nature of such regimes in the context of 
Australian law. In particular it will look at the current voluntary and 
mandatory systems, their relative strengths and weaknesses, and whether a 
voluntary ‘comply or explain’ system is valuable. 
 
 
II CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
While it is not the purpose of this paper to analyse the concept of ‘corporate 
governance’, it has generally been described as the system by which 
companies are controlled,3 the direction of a company by those authorised to 
govern4 and the systems of accountability of those in control.5 While a 
fundamental concern of corporate governance is accountability, governance 
should also be assessed on the basis of predictability, transparency and 
participation.6  
 
Corporate governance regulatory reforms (domestic and international) have 
been prompted by corporate collapses7 and poor stock market performance, 
                                                 
2 I Anand, ‘Voluntary vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance: Towards an Optimal 
Regulatory Framework’, Queens University, Law and Economics Workshop, 3 
<http://papers.ssrn.com> at 10 August 2006. 
3 I Ramsay (ed), Key Developments in Corporate Law and Trusts Law: Essays in 
Honour of Professor Harold Ford (2002) 133. 
4 G Shailer, ‘An Introduction to Corporate Governance in Australia’ (2004) 2. 
5 J Farrar, ‘Corporate Governance and the Judges’ (2003) 15 Bond Law Review 65, 
66.  
6 Shailer, above, n 4, 14. 
7 Note that since the 1990s, corporate collapses have included: US - Enron, 
World.Com, Tyco, Polaroid, Qwest, ImClone; Australia - HIH, Ansett, Lateral 
Trading, Water Wheel Holdings; UK - Griffin Trading, Universal Bulk Handling, 
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the latter of which was perceived as being attributable to questionable 
corporate governance practices.8 Other forces which, combined, generate a 
demand for corporate governance practice reform include: the growth of 
small shareholder activism; board control and disclosure of remuneration 
(leading to controversies concerning perceived excessive senior executives’ 
remuneration); community demand that companies operate their businesses 
as good citizens; and stakeholders (other than members and employees) 
expecting their interests to be taken into account in the management of the 
company.9 It was, however, the recent corporate collapses that brought an 
end to the complacency that prevailed about corporate governance after many 
years of sustained growth in Australia.10 A desire was engendered to design a 
system which protects investors from managerial abandon while preventing 
compliance from hindering economic performance. 
 
 
III REGULATION: ‘MANDATORY’ AND ‘VOLUNTARY’ 
 
Regulation of corporate governance is a prominent part of a good corporate 
governance model. In Australia, corporate governance is regulated through 
binding and non-binding rules, international recommendations and industry-
specific standards, commentaries of scholars and practitioners and judicial 
precedents. Various commentators have espoused different theoretical and 
pragmatic descriptions for the categories and types of corporate governance 
regulation. Shailer suggests that regulation of corporate governance can be 
achieved formally or informally through four primary mechanisms, namely 
lawmaking (statutory provisions and court-developed common law); 
stakeholder concentration to increase their monitoring and control 
capabilities; market discipline; and formal contracting between stakeholders 
and the company.11 Farrar takes a broader approach and prefers regulation in 
                                                                                                                    
Marconi/GEC, Polly Peck International, ITV Digital, RailTrack, Powerhouse; 
Canada - Phoenix Research & Trading, YBM Magnex, Nortel Networks, Teleglobe; 
Japan - Lateral Trading, Resona Bank; Germany - Phillip Holzmann AG, Herlitz, 
Babcock Borsig, Kirk Gruppe; Belgium – Sabena; Italy - Parmalat: Acuaah-Gaisie, 
above n 1, 2. 
8 J McConvill, ‘Of Stewards, Surfboards and Homo Sapiens: Reflections on the 
Regulation of Contemporary Corporate Governance’ (1 February 2005), 2 
<http://ssrn.com/paper=660762> at 12 May 2006. 
9 Ramsay, above n 3, 135-6. 
10 J Du Plessis, ‘Reverberations After the HIH and other recent Australian corporate 
collapses: The role of ASIC’ (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225, 
236.  
11 Shailer, above n 4, 19. 
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the sense of ‘hard law’, meaning traditional black letter law, and ‘soft law’, 
which includes voluntary sources of corporate governance standards which 
companies have the freedom to adopt of not, and ‘hybrids’ which fall 
somewhere between the two.12 The aforementioned descriptions can be 
abridged by characterising certain corporate governance practices as 
‘mandatory’ or ‘voluntary’. ‘Mandatory’ means legally mandated with 
sanctions for non-compliance and/or contravention. ‘Voluntary’ means 
discretionary in the absence of legal compulsion. It is, however, difficult to 
strictly categorise corporate governance regimes as purely mandatory or 
voluntary since most regimes exhibit characteristics of both, therefore 
arguably forming a ‘hybrid’.  
 
 
IV CONTEMPORANEOUS MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY 
SYSTEMS 
 
 A Mandatory examples 
 
Countries have specialised laws that regulate various rights and obligations 
which constrain or facilitate corporate governance. The traditional legal 
regime for any regulated activity is a system of rules that prescribe certain 
behaviour and impose penalties for non-compliance. The primary incentive 
for compliance is fear of the consequences of non-compliance.13 Australia’s 
fundamental source of corporate legislation, the Corporations Act 2001 (‘the 
Act’), contains various provisions which directly and indirectly influence all 
aspects of a company’s governance arrangements. The Act regulates internal 
procedures, stock transactions and directors' duties and responsibilities. It 
also covers board appointments and composition, board independence, 
systems and processes, voting methods, equity, values and codes of ethics, 
reporting and accountability, transparency, and the role of stakeholders.It 
provides for prosecution of criminal practices such as collusion, internal 
trading and fraud. Of note are the financial reporting provisions under 
Chapter 2M which are intended to ensure that the financial aspects of a 
company’s governance practices are characterised by transparency and 
accountability. Non-compliance may result in penalties.14 Other legislation 
that directly affects the regulation of corporations and their governance 
includes the ASIC Act 2001, the Financial Services Reform Act 2004, the 
                                                 
12 Farrar, above n 5, 67.  
13 Anand, above n 2, 6. 
14 See Corporations Act 2001 ss 286 and 344. 
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Managed Investments Act 1998, the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) 
Act 1993, the Trade Practices Act 1974; and the Crimes Act 1914.  
 
While the Corporations Act 2001  contains a number of important corporate 
governance mandates, not all of the corporate governance rules pursuant to 
the Act are prescriptive in nature. The Act provides companies with a degree 
of discretion in relation to the internal arrangements and management of their 
company. Relevantly, most of the rules governing a company’s internal 
arrangements and management may be contained in its constitution or articles 
of association, or alternatively in a set of replaceable rules.15   
 
The mandatory regulation of companies and their management also takes the 
form of disclosure requirements. Listed Australian companies are subject to 
three sources of compulsory disclosure: the Act, accounting standards and the 
ASX Listing Rules.  
 
• Disclosure of information by ‘disclosing entities’ is the subject of 
detailed statutory requirements under Chapter 6CA of the Act. A 
contravention of the continuous disclosure obligations under the Act 
can result in significant penalties,16 including criminal penalties in 
some instances.17  
• The accounting standards are a collection of generally accepted 
accounting practices set by the Australian Accounting Standards 
Board under the supervision of the financial Reporting Council. 
Those standards are given statutory force under the Act and the 
requirement to prepare financial reports in accordance with the 
standards can be enforced under the Act18. Since the implementation 
of the CLERP 9 reforms in 2004, auditing standards may be regarded 
as ‘hard law’ since s 307A of the Act provides, in effect, that if an 
auditor conducts an audit of the financial report for a financial year, 
the auditor must conduct the audit in accordance with the auditing 
standards19.  
• The ASX Listing Rules govern the admission of corporate entities to 
the official list and establish certain disclosure requirements. Non-
                                                 
15 Note Corporations Act 2001 ss 135 and 141. 
16 For example, in July 2006, Chemeq was fined $500,000.00 by the Federal Court 
for two breaches of its continuous disclosure obligations. 
17 See Corporations Act 2001 s 678. 
18 Corporations Act 2001 ss 296 & 304. 
19 J Du Plessis, J McConvill and M Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance (2005) 120. 
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compliance may warrant removal from the official list. While some 
contend that the ASX Listing Rules are a ‘hybrid’,20 and that they 
‘operate as a matter of contract’, notwithstanding that they are given 
statutory recognition;21 the fact that they are given statutory force 
under s 793C of the Act suggests that they are more mandatory than 
hybrid.  
  
Aside from legislation, the common law plays a significant part in defining 
corporate governance. The judiciary has been instrumental in delineating 
corporate governance through its role in interpreting legislation and applying 
the principles of the law. Whereas the general trend of corporate governance 
law has been towards ever increasing legislation, particularly of a regulatory 
kind, a substantial amount of regulation emanates from case law.22 Similarly, 
the findings of relevant commissions of inquiry, such as the HIH Royal 
Commission (2003) have been influential on the judiciary and legislature in 
stating suitable governance practices.  
 
 
 B Voluntary examples 
 
Legal regulation is at the core of corporate governance and is focused on 
specific corporate issues. Surrounding that regulation are hybrid and 
voluntary systems which differ in degrees of ‘hardness’ and ‘softness’.   
 
 
1 Hybrids 
 
‘Hybrid’ systems of corporate governance regulation have been described as 
a type of ‘enforced self-regulation’.23 Self-regulation is part of the new 
regulatory state and possesses some intrinsic contradictions: it is a form of 
privatisation, yet at the same time it is a part of a system of more regulation 
with increasing symbiosis of public and private regulation.24  
 
                                                 
20 Farrar, above n 5, 67. 
21 J Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice (2nd ed, 2005) 
351. 
22 Farrar, above n 5, 69. 
23 Du Plessis et al, above n 19, 117. 
24 Farrar, above n 21, 347. 
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An example of a hybrid system is the ASX Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (‘the ASX Principles’). 25 
The ASX Principles articulate 10 principles (together with 28 relevant 
recommendations) that the ASX Corporate Governance Council (‘the 
Council’) believes underlie good corporate governance. The Council does not 
identify any particular framework or set of underlying principles used to 
develop their list, but they have the stated intention of providing a reference 
point for enhanced structures to minimise problems and optimise 
performance and accountability.26 According to the Council, the ASX 
Principles are not prescriptive; they are guidelines, designed to produce 
efficiency, quality and integrity in governance.27 They do not require a ‘one 
size fits all’28 nor a ‘tick a box’ approach to corporate governance.29 Instead, 
they state aspirations of best practice for optimising performance and 
accountability in the interest of shareholders and the broader economy. If a 
company considers that a principle is inappropriate to its particular 
circumstances, it has the flexibility to decide whether or not to adopt it. That 
choice is, however, tempered by the requirement to explain if not, why not?30  
 
Farrar asserts that the ASX Principles are a form of ‘soft law’, given that they 
are not strictly mandatory rules, backed up by statutory force, but rather 
operate under a ‘comply or explain’ regime31. Nonetheless, he concedes that 
non-compliance with that regime may motivate the ASX and ASIC to focus 
on that particular company32. Du Plessis et al suggest that the ASX Principles 
should come under the ‘hybrid’ category because the ‘comply or explain’ 
regime stems from Listing Rule 4.10.3 which states that listed entities must 
comply with the 28 recommendations or explain in their annual report why 
they have not done so. Listed companies do not, however, have complete 
freedom to choose whether or not to comply with the recommendations. To 
depart from any one of the 28 recommendations contained in the ASX 
                                                 
25 Released March 2003: See <http://www.asx.com.au> . 
26 
<http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/governance/principles_good_corporate_govern
ance.htm> . 
27 Ibid.  
28 <http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/IRG_Exception_examples_final.pdf> . 
29 K Hamilton, ‘If not, why not?: In conversation with Karen Hamilton, Chairperson, 
ASX Corporate Governance Council’, Keeping Good Companies (2003) 218. 
30 
<http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/governance/principles_good_corporate_govern
ance.htm> . 
31 Farrar, above n 5, 67. 
32 Farrar, above n 21, 358. 
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Principles, companies need to give their reasons for doing so. A failure to 
provide that justification technically constitutes a breach of Listing Rule 
4.10.3, for which sanctions are available. That said, this Listing Rule has 
certain hallmarks of a mandatory rule. However, how the ASX (and ASIC) 
would enforce such non-compliance remains to be seen33 and what may 
constitute a satisfactory explanation is uncertain.  
 
2 Soft law 
 
Soft law involves purely voluntary codes and guidelines articulating 
benchmarks for what is considered best practice in corporate governance. It 
also includes academic and trade writings that influence companies to shape 
their internal arrangements and management to achieve best practice34. While 
regulatory prescription focuses on specific corporate issues, soft law is seen 
to specifically address corporate governance.  
 
Recent examples of soft-law corporate governance codes include the 
Investment and Financial Services Association Limited guidelines Corporate 
Governance: A Guide for Investment Managers and Corporations (which 
focus on board composition and competence, and disclosure)35 and the 
Australian Councils of Super Investors Inc Corporate Governance 
Guidelines for Superannuation Fund Trustees and Corporations (which 
focuses on accountability to shareholders and transparency, with considerable 
emphasis on disclosure). 36 Other organisations, such as the International 
Organization for Standardization, have developed more specific standards in 
particular areas.37 Similarly, the OECD has developed voluntary codes for 
multinational corporations.38  
 
 
V VOLUNTARY VERSUS MANDATORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
                                                 
33 N Ellem, ‘If Not, Why Not?’, August 
2003,<http://www.findlaw.com.au/article/9566.htm> at 29 April 2006. 
34 Du Plessis et al, above n 19, 120. 
35 See <http://www.ecgi.org/codes> . 
36 See <http://www.acsi.org.au> . 
37 Note for example ISO 14000 standards for managing and reporting the company’s 
environment impact and ISO9000 standards for quality assurance in business-to-
business dealings; see <http://www.iso.org>  . 
38 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: see 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.h
tml>  
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The merits and weaknesses of mandatory and voluntary systems of regulating 
corporate governance traverse many practical and economic issues.  
 
 
 A Minimum standards 
 
A major advantage of the mandatory structure is that it allows states to 
establish minimum standards to which companies must adhere. Without 
prescriptive regulation, directors and managers may depart from standards of 
corporate governance best practice due to a preference for more self-
interested transactions and arrangements.39 While investors are not 
unequivocally better protected through a mandatory system, the state is able 
to achieve its investor protection objective directly because market 
participants are compelled to comply or face regulatory penalties for non-
compliance. By contrast, a voluntary system provides no guarantees that the 
minimum governance standards established will be achieved40 and the 
language used in voluntary codes is sometimes vague and less than 
compelling41.  
 
Other benefits of a mandatory system, according to the evidence, are that 
regimes with strong investor protection lead to healthy capital markets.42 
Similarly, in countries with strong legal protections, capital markets are 
larger, since potential investors are shielded against expropriation by 
entrepreneurs.43 On the other hand, it is suggested that corporate governance 
regulation dominated by formal legal rules could actually work against the 
best interests of corporations.44 This, however, says nothing about investors’ 
interests. 
 
 
 B Compliance Levels 
 
Anand suggests that compliance will be high if the penalties for non-
compliance are onerous and that an awareness in the market of sanctions 
                                                 
39 J McConvill, ‘Of Stewards, Surfboards and Homo Sapiens: Reflections on the 
Regulation of Contemporary Corporate Governance’ (1 February 2005) 25, 
<http://ssrn.com/paper=660762> at 10 February 2006. 
40 Anand, above n 2, 6. 
41 J Austin in ASIC v Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 341. 
42 Anand, above n 2, 6. 
43 Ibid 7. 
44 McConvill, above n 39, 43. 
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actually imposed for breaches may encourage consistency45. The fact that 
ASIC commenced 215 criminal, civil and administrative proceedings in 
2004/05 involving 300 people or companies which resulted in 27 persons 
being imprisoned for fraud or dishonesty offences should perhaps provide the 
necessary encouragement.46 By contrast, lack of compliance is a significant 
weakness of voluntary regimes. Voluntary regimes are seen merely as 
communication vehicles by companies that wish to project particular 
intentions and standards, and the failure to regulate compliance undermines 
the systems’ credibility47. Armstrong notes that whereas most companies 
support voluntary corporate governance codes, few actually intend to adopt 
them48. While many Australian companies state that ensuring compliance 
with companies’ legislation is an important part of their function, a number 
of surveys have concluded that the state of compliance structures within those 
companies does not support that claim49.   
 
While voluntary systems incorporating self-regulation may work in some 
circumstances, they are unlikely to achieve the desired degree of compliance. 
Recent high-profile corporate collapses across the world have demonstrated 
that self-regulation is not sufficient; it has been ‘abused’ and tougher 
regulation may be required50. Similarly, Enron and the HIH Royal 
Commission have exposed the ineffectiveness of existing voluntary self-
regulating systems, not to mention regulatory failures. Some have said that 
‘best practices’ in corporate governance have now become the problem, not 
the solution.51 But is the answer more legislation? Professor Jere Francis 
warned Australia to move cautiously in mandating new corporate governance 
requirements, suggesting that the failures evident in Enron, WorldCom and 
HIH will always occur, regardless of the corporate governance model.52 
While voluntary regimes are less direct, conceivably they will encourage 
compliance in the long term and, as more companies adopt those practices, 
those practices may become the norm in the commercial community.  
                                                 
45 Anand, above n 2, 8. 
46 ASIC Annual Report 2004/2005, 16-21. 
47 Shailer, above n 4, 27. 
48 A Armstrong, ‘Corporate Governance standards: intangible and their tangible 
value’ (2004) 17 Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 97, 111. 
49 McConvill, above n 39, 27. 
50 Ibid. 
51 S Turnbull, ‘Corporate Accountability: An Impact on Community Expectations’, 
paper presented to the 2nd Annual Corporate Governance Symposium organised by 
Chartered Secretaries, Sydney, 4 March 2003, 2 <http://ssrn.com/paper=491982> at 
2 May 2006. 
52 Quoted by Acquaah-Gaisie, above n 1, 81. 
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 C Costs to investors 
 
Certain mandatory rules are intended to provide protection to investors in that 
they maintain a discernible and seemingly fair process for making corporate 
decisions.53 This is an extension of ‘accountability’, a concept still very much 
in vogue. A mandatory governance system decreases the cost of becoming an 
informed investor in that assessing the relative strength of the companies’ 
governance practices is relatively straightforward since each company’s 
governance practices are based on the same terms of reference. By contrast, 
under a voluntary governance system, companies are free to set their own 
terms of reference and there is less certainty for investors that the company is 
complying with the guidelines.54  
 
 
 D Costs to companies and to the state 
 
A mandatory system of corporate governance may be cost-effective for 
investors, however it is costly for the state and the company. At a state level, 
the state will bear policy design costs, implementation costs, and enforcement 
costs (including the costs of monitoring the market for compliance). In 
relation to the company, costs arise from monitoring and assessing its own 
practices, implementing new governance structures, producing disclosure and 
reports, and distributing disclosure information. This may suggest that such 
governance is not profitable. However, that perception is contradicted by 
understanding the value of good reputations,55 especially in relation to 
corporate governance issues.  
 
A large portion of the abovementioned costs may also exist under a voluntary 
regime. However, under the voluntary structure, the company’s compliance 
costs and the state’s enforcement costs (which can be significant) ought to be 
reduced. Note that even under a mandatory system, compliance is not 
guaranteed, since companies may simply ignore the law and elect to absorb 
the costs of non-compliance.56 Those enforcement penalties may in turn be 
passed on to investors, thus prejudicing those that the law is designed to 
protect.  
 
 
                                                 
53 Anand, above n 2, 9. 
54 Ibid 10.  
55 Armstrong, above n 48, 128. 
56 Anand, above n 2, 13. 
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 E Flexibility 
 
A main attribute of voluntary regimes is their flexibility for companies. 
Capital markets are populated by business entities of different sizes and 
types. Consequently, different entities will prefer governance regimes that 
can be tailored to their own circumstances. Relevantly, companies will not 
adopt any corporate governance practices. Rather, the market will dictate 
their governance practices, that is, the practices will be driven by investor 
demand and perhaps by pressure from competitors, rather than by prescribed 
legal rules.57 Mandatory regimes are inflexible and the state establishes not 
only the regimes’ objectives, but also prescribes the means to achieve those 
objectives.58 This ‘one-size-fits-all’ framework can be undesirable in terms of 
inconvenience and compliance.  
 
 
VI A VOLUNTARY ‘IF NOT WHY NOT: COMPLY OR EXPLAIN’ SYSTEM 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Whether a voluntary corporate governance system based on the principle of 
‘if not, why not?’ or ‘comply or explain’, is an effective system to ensure 
good corporate governance practices is contentious. Such a system is 
relatively prescriptive in that it does not require disclosure of compliance. 
Rather, it requires disclosure of non-compliance together with an explanation 
of why the company’s board believes that non-compliance is appropriate. 
This approach rests on the premise that shareholders could then come to their 
own conclusions about whether departures from the guidelines were justified. 
Similarly, such a system may encourage companies’ officers to think about 
their governance practices and debate why the approach they are taking is 
appropriate to their individual circumstances59. However, while such a 
system is intended to protect investors, scholarly research and recent 
corporate collapses suggest otherwise60. 
 
 
                                                 
57 Ibid 14. 
58 Ibid 15. 
59 K Farrell, D Harding and S Spilsbury  
 ‘ASX Corporate Governance Council releases its Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations’, April 2003 
<http://www.findlaw.com.au/articles/default.asp?task=read&id=8552&site=GN> at 
7 August 2006.  
60 Turnbull, above n 51, 2.  
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 A Implementation 
 
In order to enhance the prospects of this voluntary scheme (or any other, for 
that matter), it is necessary to encourage companies to implement the system. 
Typically companies assess the costs and benefits of a proposed course of 
action and will implement practices that provide them with a commercial 
advantage. While companies may benefit from adopting a ‘comply or 
explain’ corporate governance practice, implementing it may be costly and 
thus a deterrent. Relevantly, a company’s performance and effectiveness can 
be compromised by a material change such as the introduction of such a 
system.61  
 
A voluntary ‘comply or explain’ system may include (as does the ASX Best 
Practice) a requirement for the disclosure of certain information. That 
obligation is likely to incur costs (as with any other system), including the 
costs of gathering, preparing and disseminating that information. Post-
dissemination costs may include keeping abreast of relevant legal 
developments in disclosure, and the costs of disclosing damaging or 
misleading information about the company which may result in shareholders 
selling their shares62. Smaller companies may not have the funds available for 
such a process, or might consider that those funds could be better allocated 
for the benefit of shareholders63.  
 
Companies may be unwilling to adopt a ‘comply or explain’ system in the 
absence of a legal rule compelling them to do so. The fact that the ‘comply or 
explain’ system is already present in the ASX Listing Rules and the ASX 
Principles is indicative of a commercial trend and may prompt future 
legislative reform to that effect. Similarly, the fact that other companies in the 
market (ie listed corporations) already adhere to a ‘comply or explain’ system 
may of itself be a motivation64.  
 
 
 B The Merits 
 
A 'comply or explain' system may assist in preventing the devaluation of the 
company by the market. Managers may perceive that a failure to comply with 
                                                 
61 R P Austin, H A Ford, I M Ramsay, Company Directors, Principles of Law and 
Corporate Governance (2005) 29. 
62 Anand, above n 2, 18. 
63 Ellem, above n 33. 
64 McConvill, above n 39, 18. 
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the system may lead investors to draw an adverse inference and conclude that 
the failure to comply means bad news or that the decisions of the company 
are questionable. Failing to comply or withholding information may increase 
market noise because of the range of possible interpretations of that conduct. 
Consequently, the expected cost of investors discounting the value of the 
company is so high that the manager may be better served by complying with 
the system.65  
 
Investors are unlikely always to discount the value of the company if it does 
not embrace a ‘comply or explain’ voluntary system. The absence of such a 
system is not likely to be determinative of their choice of investment. 
Investor scepticism typically depends on many factors (for example, the 
disclosure history of the company and its performance, including its share 
price) and whether or not a company adheres to a ‘comply or explain’ system 
may be yet another factor to consider. Where investors receive a high return, 
they will have little incentive to analyse and evaluate the company’s 
governance structure. On the other hand, poor performance may cause 
investors to search for reasons why and they may conclude that the 
company’s performance might improve if its governance structure were 
enhanced66. In any event, unless there are clearly visible signs of managerial 
failure, individual investors can be expected to follow management.67   
 
An effect of a ‘comply or explain’ system is that it requires companies to 
publicise a lot of information that was not previously made available to 
investors. That information may enable investors to assess whether they are 
content with the company’s governance and structure.68 Companies respond 
to investors’ desire for such information for reasons relating to their own 
business rather than for benevolent reasons. However, investors are primarily 
concerned with obtaining financial information relating to purchasing and 
maintaining their investment portfolios, not necessarily corporate governance 
issues.69 
 
The range in size and diversity of companies is significant in a ‘comply or 
explain’ system and smaller companies may face particular issues in 
                                                 
65 Anand, above n 2, 17. 
66 Ibid. 
67 A Dignam and M Galanis, ‘Australia Inside-Out: The Corporate Governance 
System of the Australia Listed Market’ (2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 
623, 631. 
68 Hamilton, above n 29, 220. 
69 Anand, above n 2, 17. 
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satisfying all the relevant principles.70 Smaller companies may well consider 
that their level of activities does not warrant some of the principles, and while 
the option not to disclose is available, the reporting requirements will mean 
that those smaller companies will be required nonetheless to justify their 
position to shareholders and the market alike.71 
 
A voluntary ‘comply or explain’ system may also create competitive 
disadvantages. A company may be reluctant to disclose certain information 
from which its competitors can benefit. Indeed corporate governance systems 
such as that of disclosure have a high cost and relative low utility.72 This also 
raises the possibility of ‘free-riding’. That is, companies and investors do not 
want to dedicate time and funds to disclosure systems that create value for 
rivals.73 Despite this, a company may be more inclined to voluntarily disclose 
information relating to corporate governance practices where that information 
is constructive rather than harmful.  
 
 
 C Effectiveness 
 
Whether or not a ‘comply or explain’ system would be effective is arguable. 
On one hand, the system is relatively pragmatic and flexible. It allows due 
regard to be had to companies’ individual circumstances and in particular 
allows the size and complexity of the company and the nature of the risks and 
challenges it faces to be borne in mind. Departure from the substantive 
principles of a ‘comply or explain’ system may be justified in particular 
circumstances: for example, smaller companies may believe that some of the 
provisions are oppressive or less relevant in their case. Such a system may 
impress upon companies what stakeholders believe are best practices but still 
give the companies the flexibility to explain why certain best practices are 
not really best practice in their particular circumstances, or why there is a 
better way of doing things.74 
 
That the efficacy of voluntary, self-regulatory, corporate governance systems 
has been undermined by recent corporate collapses is difficult to refute. Some 
have contended that a further voluntary system of this type merely adds to the 
raft of so-called ‘best practices’ which are supposedly based on myths and 
                                                 
70 Austin et al, above n 61, 29. 
71 Ellem, above n 33. 
72 Farrar, above n 5, 69. 
73 Dignam et al, above n 67, 635. 
74 Hamilton, above n 29, 218. 
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rhetoric that the average citizen rightly sees as a diversionary activity, 
delaying recognition of the core problem.75 Enforcement of corporate 
governance codes based on ‘comply or explain’ can only work where those to 
whom the explanation is addressed are able to hold the board to account. 
Baxt, however, suggests that a ‘comply or explain’ system actually creates 
problems in that it appears that any person aggrieved could challenge a 
company’s failure to explain its compliance.76 This could conceivably open 
the flood-gates for all manner of proceedings by disgruntled stakeholders.   
 
For a voluntary ‘comply or explain’ system to be truly effective, the 
commercial community must uniformly support and engage in the process. In 
order to achieve this, all companies must be encouraged to consider an 
evaluation of the benefits of compliance versus the costs of implementing 
compliance procedures in terms of unrecoverable expenses and the loss of 
effective structures.77 A focus on propriety in the management of companies 
is obviously not an inappropriate one. It is clearly important, from a moral 
and practical perspective, that companies are, and are perceived to be, 
managed honestly.78 A ‘comply or explain’ system promotes this objective.  
 
 
VII CONCLUSION 
 
The formalisation of corporate governance regulation has been considered a 
necessary initiative to respond to high-profile corporate collapses which were 
perceived as being attributable to less-than-desirable corporate governance 
practices. Those collapses resulted in significant reforms in the financial 
markets and in the corporations law over a very short period of time.79 
However, it would prove difficult to maintain that degree of legislative 
change over a protracted period. Relevantly, there is evidence to suggest that 
the already onerous provisions of Australia’s new corporate governance 
regime is the 21st century version of the Royal Charter and that leading 
executives and company chairmen are becoming increasingly critical of the 
                                                 
75 Turnbull, above n 51, 2. 
76 B Baxt, ‘Corporate Governance - Is this the Answer to Corporate Failures?’ (2003) 
29 Monash University Law Review 234, 259. 
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demands made on them80. That these criticisms have received a positive 
reception from the legislature is arguably evidenced by the introduction of the 
recent Simpler Regulatory System Bill (2006) which promises to provide 
some relief.  
 
The economic and social significance of corporations ensures that they will 
continue to be subject to close statutory regulation in any jurisdiction where 
the Government is responsive to the concerns of its citizenry.81 Criticisms, 
such as those of Justice Austin, of voluntary or self-regulating standards as 
‘vague and less than compelling’ compared with black letter law have some 
merit. However, judges have nonetheless regarded voluntary systems as 
persuasive reference points.82 That said, it appears that, despite the increase in 
black letter law, government regulation alone may not be appropriate or 
effective in addressing many of the issues emerging from disclosure of 
discrepancies in corporate governance best practices.  
 
The best corporate governance principles and best practice recommendations 
in the world are not going to prevent human error or corporate collapse or 
just a change in the environment.83 Research has found little evidence to 
support any relationship between comprehensive corporate governance and 
performance.84 All corporate governance guidelines and standards, whether 
mandatory or voluntary, have their relative strengths and weaknesses and no 
one regime, of itself, is optimal. The disparity between the regimes is perhaps 
their greatest collective attribute for it affords companies a degree of 
flexibility, while the core standards are relatively prescriptive, thus 
comforting the stakeholder. However, at the end of the day, a company 
should be assessed on its performance, not strictly the road it has taken to get 
to that destination. The corporate governance principles cannot be an end in 
themselves. Much still remains to be done by way of corporate governance 
reform, but the Australian economy is now stronger and better for the reforms 
to date.  
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